Agroholdings membership: does that make a difference in performance? by Hockmann, H. et al.
  
 
Agroholdings membership: does that make a difference in 
performance? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HEINRICH HOCKMANNa, RAUSHAN BOKUSHEVAa, AND IRINA 
BEZLEPKINAb
aIAMO, Institute of Agricultural Development in Central in Eastern Europe in Halle, 
Germany 
b Business Economics, Wageningen University, The Netherlands 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paper prepared for presentation at the 102th EAAE Seminar ‘Superlarge Farming 
Companies: Emergence and Possible Impacts’, Moscow, Russia, date as in: May 17-18, 
2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright 2007 by [Heinrich Hockmann, Raushan Bokusheva, and Irina Bezlepkina].  All 
rights reserved.  Readers may make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial 
purposes by any means, provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies.
 1
 Agroholdings membership: does that make a difference in performance?  
 
Heinrich Hockmanna∗, Raushan Bokushevaa, and Irina Bezlepkinab 
aIAMO, Institute of Agricultural Development in Central in Eastern Europe in Halle, 
Germany 
b Business Economics, Wageningen University, The Netherlands 
 
 
Paper submitted for presentation at the 
102
th 
EAAE Seminar  
“Superlarge Farming Companies: Emergence and Possible Impacts”,  
May 17-18, 2007 
 
Abstract  
Comparing different organizational, managerial and economic indicators of the farms in two 
selected regions the study investigates whether agroholdings perform better and thus can be 
regarded as a promising organizational model for Russian agriculture. A comparatively poor 
performance of agroholdings’ members in both regions implies that this organisational form 
suffers from principal management problems hampering the move of agricultural production 
towards efficient trajectories. The insights regarding the selection of agroholdings’ members, 
farm restructuring, marketing activities and performance cannot however be simply 
transferred to Russian agriculture in general. In both regions analyzed the establishing of 
agroholdings was strongly promoted by the local government which induces a bias in the 
reason to integrate. 
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 1 Introduction  
In the past decade, Russian agriculture has undergone transformations that have had a  
remarkable impact on its current development. Despite the emergence of 275 thousand family 
farms, mainly during the period 1990-1994, the predominant part of agricultural output is 
produced by corporate agricultural farms, i.e. former collective (kolkhoz) and state (sovkhoz) 
farms. In 2004 their share in gross agricultural production (GAP) amounted to 42.8 per cent. 
and - 62, 58 and 87 per cent in grain, potato and milk production, respectively (Rosstat, 2006). 
In the late nineties, Russian corporate farms began to merge into large companies 
(agroholdings) cultivating between 10,000-250,000 hectares. At the beginning, the reasons 
for emergence of these superlarge companies were primarily economic (Wandel, 2000). Later 
on, this organization model has been extensively used as a blueprint by regional authorities to 
reduce the number of strongly indebted farms. Though the Russian Statistical Agency 
(Rosstat) does not provide official information on agroholdings, these companies are argued 
to be relatively widespread in Russian agriculture at the moment. According to Petrikov 
(2005a), there should be at least 241 of them in 27 different Russian regions. In general, there 
is not so much literature investigating the agroholdings development in Russia. A few studies 
that exist consider primarily the reasons for their emergence and describe their organizational 
structures (Baklashenko, 2000; Hockmann et al, 2005; Rylko and Jolly, 2005; Zlobin, 2002), 
while performance of agroholdings and major differences with other corporate farms remain 
rather uninvestigated. At present there is no serious economic argument in favour of 
agroholdings’ blueprinting. In this paper, based on the data survey of agricultural enterprises 
in the Oroel oblast we aim to analyze comparatively performance of farms – members of 
agroholdings – with that of independent corporate farms in this region. Based on theoretical 
concepts as well as comparing different organizational, managerial and economic indicators 
 3
 of the surveyed farms we are investigating whether agroholdings perform better and thus can 
be regarded as a promising organizational model for Russian agriculture.     
The paper is organized as follows. The next section proceeds with an attempt to provide 
a definition to agroholdings. In section 3, literature review focusing the relation between 
performance and reasons for vertical integration is carried out. Section 4 presents analytical 
procedure of the empirical analysis and introduces the data. Section 5 starts with analyzing  
the performance of agroholdings based on aggregated data and continues with comparative 
analysis based on individual farm characteristics. Conclusions are drawn in the final section. 
2 Agroholdings: An attempt of a definition  
After the 1998 financial crisis Russian corporate farms began to merge into large units 
cultivating between 10,000-250,000 hectares (Rylko and Jolly, 2005). Though there has been 
no official name for this new organizational form in the literature, in various studies they are 
referred as new agricultural operators (Rylko and Jolly, 2005), giant enterprises (Hockmann, 
2005), integrated agroindustrial formations (Petrikov, 2005a), vertically integrated holdings, 
or agroholdings (Oganesov, 2004). Perhaps the most common name for these new structures 
is ‘agroholdings’ which will be also used in this paper. Following the definition by Ušačev 
(2002a) which is widely spread in the Russian agricultural literature, an agroholding is ‘the 
collectivity of juristic persons which are connected by contract or property relations and 
where one enterprise takes on the function of a main company (russ. golovnaja kompanija)“1. 
This definition is rather broad and covers a variety of institutional and organizational 
arrangements from ownership (purchase of shares), joint production planning and 
coordination, land lease contracts to the provision of services. The organisational form of 
                                                 
1  Differently from the meaning of "Agroholdings" in Western countries (see Keller, 1993) the Russian 
interpretation does not only include the possibility that the holding company practices its own production 
activities. Additionally, the participating enterprises are not necessarily obliged to be connected by ownership 
relations but also on the basis of cooperation contracts (Ušačev, 2002a). 
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 vertical relationships can be defined as configuration of four distinct but related dimensions of 
integration: ownership, task, coordination and knowledge. A theoretical study of Jaspers and 
van den Ende (2006) provides a theoretical framework targeted at understanding of how 
vertical structures are organised. In Russia, agroholdings differ (1) by the way and number of 
the integrated production, processing and services stages, (2) in the degree of the judicial and 
economic independence of the integrated enterprises, and (3) in the organizational structure. 
In many holdings the various forms of governance exist simultaneously, that is to say the 
members are linked to each other by a number of different connections. Often the partners 
come from all stages of the food chain, i.e. farms and upstream and downstream stages. Banks 
and other businesses, such as oil or metallurgy companies, are often members as well. In 
many regions the state is not an insignificant shareholder either.  
In some Russian Oblasts agroholdings are basically not present, in others, especially in 
those in the Southern Russia they controlled about one third of the agricultural land in 2002. 
For example, their share in agricultural land use was 37% in oblast Oroel and  31% in oblast 
Belgorod (Kurtoeva,  2003). According to Petrikov (2005b), agroholdings manage more than 
73 % of the agricultural land in Belgorod Oblast in recent years. Information from Moscow 
oblast also indicates that the emergence of agroholdings has accelerated recently in this region 
as well. According to Petrikov (2005a), there should be at least 241 of them in 27 different 
Russian regions. The non-uniform terminology can be regarded as one reason for the lack of 
reliable official data concerning the meaning of the integrated structures in the Russian 
agriculture and food science (Khramova, 2002). Another reason is that the statistical 
institutions on federal and regional level in Russia have shown such information only isolated 
and unsystematically; especially because agroholding does not represent any officially 
accepted enterprise or judicial form (Khramova, 2002, Rodionova and Dackova, 2005; 
Petrikov, 2005b). Clearly, the first source of data obtained by means of surveys or collection 
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 of book-keeping data is an advantage for anyone wishing to study this subject. The data 
clarifying the type of internal organization is of great importance as well. 
 
3 Vertical integration and performance 
The growing theoretical literature in strategy and industrial organization economics indicates 
that there is substantial incentive for firms to vertically integrate and thereby improve their 
performance. The incentive to integrate depends on the type of production involved, the 
extent of transaction costs, the amount of specialized assets, the degree of market power at 
each stage of production, the separability of activities, and the amount of uncertainty covering 
prices and costs (Daveni and Ravenscraft, 1994). The empirical literature shows that vertical 
integration effect on profitability is ambiguous (Bhuyan, 2001). Studying the impact of 
vertical mergers in US food manufacturing – as a type of vertical ownership integration 
Pinjab finds no support for improved performance and concludes that increasing capital 
intensity as a strategy to increase profit does not result in improved profitability.  
The relation between a membership in agroholdings and performance of an integrated 
firm is not straightforward, because this is largely determined by the reasons for integration. 
A stream of literature discussing the integrated structures in Russia suggests that vertically 
integrated structures were supposed to cope with unfavourable agricultural terms of trade 
(input prices increased faster than output prices, especially in the period 1990-1994) (see 
Novikov, 1995; Rodionova, 2002; Miloserdov, 2002). Following the Ministry of agriculture 
of Russian Federation, agroholdings should have contributed to the restructuring of bankrupt 
enterprises: ‘farms, which are in financial difficulties and ‘healthy’ enterprises from other 
sectors with sufficient financial resources or access to credits, should merge’ (see Minselhoz, 
2001; Ušačev, 2002a). According to a survey conducted in Rostov and Stavropol regions (see 
Khramova, 2003), the most frequently named reasons were: (1) the assurance of supply of 
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 agricultural raw materials, (2) the ‘recommendation’ of oblast and/or rayon governance and 
(3) the securing of access and repayment of credits.  
Hockmann et al (2003) find the low concentration in the Russian food sector as a 
further reason for the emergence of the highly integrated structures there. By comparison with 
Western Europe, the Russian food industry has had a very fragmented structure of food 
market. To succeed in the long term in national and international markets, concentration was 
indispensable. Thus, this type of integration would rather imply an improved performance of 
integrated companies. 
There is a lack of evidence about the impact of the agroholdings membership on the 
development of agricultural sector in Russia, and even more importantly, about economic 
sustainability of these organisational structures. Moreover, the extent to which agroholdings 
provide a suitable model for Russian agriculture depends on whether factors used by them 
have remuneration which can be comparable with that in other organisational forms.  
 
4 Analytical procedure 
 Limited empirical evidence signals that agroholdings make significant investments and 
introduce technological improvements into agricultural production (see Rylko and Jolly, 
2005, Petrikov, 2005a) hereby releasing surplus labour. In general, the impact of different 
technologies on agricultural production can be regarded by employing the following 
relationship: 
(1) 
L
A
A
Y
L
Y = , 
where Y, A, L denotes output, labour input, and land, respectively. Land-saving 
technologies are generally associated with a higher output per hectare (Y/L). Accordingly, 
labour-saving technologies found their expression in the man-land ratio (A/L), because, the 
more land is cultivated per worker, the higher is the requirement for equipment and 
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 machinery. Thus, in this context, land-man ratio can serve as an indicator of the intensity of 
the technology adopted. 
 These facts point at intensification of production in the agroholdings and thus suggest  
Hypothesis 1: Due to more capital intensive production, agroholding members will 
exhibit a higher land-man ratio than independent corporate farms. 
Further on, since agroholdings are expected to operate with modern equipment and, 
additionally, have released part of their labour, this suggests  
The Hypothesis 2: Membership in an agroholding is supposed to increase the 
remuneration of resources, especially that of labour, i.e. labour productivity must be 
greater in an agroholding than in an independent farm (since such factors as capital 
have to be remunerated, the remuneration of labour should be adjusted to that of other 
factors ).  
We will investigate this hypothesis by looking at the decomposion of labour 
productivity in land productivity and land-man ratio: 
(2) 
L
A
A
Y
L
Y = , or equivalently ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
L
A
A
Y
L
Y lnlnln  
where Y, L, and A denotes output, labour input, and land, respectively. 
Next to testing these hypotheses, the two groups (agroholdings versus other farms) are 
compared to find any statistical differences in their performance. In studying similarities and 
divergences of corporate dairy producers by their performance, managerial and structural 
characteristics, Bezlepkina et al (2007) identified several variables (see also Figure 1) that 
characterise each of the four dimensions of farm environment: 1) physical, composed of 
seasonal weather conditions and the variability of these conditions; physical environment 
through the technology also defines such parameters as yields, intensity and specialisation, 
which also have impact on farm performance; 2) economic, determining the relative as well as 
the absolute level of input and output prices, investment opportunities; 3) social, prescribing 
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 labour conditions and social networks; and 4) institutional, prescribing rules for the use of 
debt capital, rules for payment of taxes, legal rights and obligations, conditions for the 
relations between the state, institutions and producers, restructuring processes.  
Management 
Economic results / Performance 
Institutional environment 
(legal form and ownership, 
capital structure, soft budget 
constraints, subsidies) 
Economic environment  
(prices, investment 
opportunities, wages) 
Social environment  
(labour conditions, wages, 
human capital, motivation, 
social security, trust, relation 
with households)  
 
Physical environment 
(Weather, soil, infrastructure, 
technology, size)  
D
ec
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on
-m
ak
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g 
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s 
 
Figure 1 Relation between farm performance and environment, see Bezlepkina et al (2007) 
 
In this study we distinguish the following characteristics of agroholdings and other 
farms to compare their performance and structures: a) size, specialisation, technology, farm 
location and crop yields (Physical environment); b) legal form and ownership type, farm 
restructuring and debts (Institutional environment); c) output and input prices, investments 
(Economic environment) and d) wages, age, education (Social environment). Farm 
management is approached through the measures of technical efficiency by means of Data 
Envelopment Analysis (see Coelli (1998) and Appendix 1) and overall measures of economic 
performance such as profitability, returns per factor input. When comparing two groups, the 
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 effect of farming environment is cleared up from stochastic elements (weather, price 
fluctuations) by analysing farm characteristics averaged over years.  
Many studies analysing the vertically integrated structures acknowledge the data 
problems. This paper partly overcomes this difficulty by using the survey of farms in Orel 
oblast, including 11 agroholdings (data from 1999-2003) and bookkeeping data of 268 farms 
(182 – agroholdings’ members and 86 independent farms) in Belgorod oblast (2001-2003). 
The data from Belgorod oblast are limited in terms of variables available and therefore are 
used in testing the first two hypotheses. The rest of the analysis is performed by using the 
survey data from Orel oblast. The survey was conducted in 2004 and its further description 
can be found in (Bokusheva et al., 2007) and Appendix 2. 
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 5 Results 
5.1 Aggregated data analysis 
As a first step in our analysis we compare average values of labour productivity across 
various groups of farming units by using three sources of data: survey results, bookkeeping 
data and statistical yearbooks. 
Figure 1: Choice of Technology by Farm Type and Region 
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Source: Goskomstat Rossii (2003), Bookkeeping results of holdings, Oblast Belgorod (data for 2001-
2003), Data on farms in Oblast Oreol in 2002 (Petrikov, 2005). 
Figure 1 presents the inverse indicators of land and labour productivity for 5 different 
groups of farms: agroholdings in Belgorod and Oroel regions and independent corporate 
farms in these two regions as well as in Russia in general. Promptly we can recognise that in 
both regions, agroholdings operate more labour extensive than independent Russian farms. 
This supports the empirical evidence that agroholdings make significant investments in order 
to adjust agricultural technology (see Rylko and Jolly, 2005, Petrikov, 2005a). Moreover, 
there is an indication that investment has primarily labour-saving than land-saving 
characteristics since only the first mentioned type of investment leads to a tightening of the 
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 land–man ratio due to cultivation of a given amount of land with a lower labour input 
(Hayami and Ruttan, 1985). 
Figure 1 also indicates that the switch of technologies does not necessarily lead to an 
increase of efficiency: Assuming constant returns to scale, units isoquants (in 1 mio Roubles) 
can be introduced into Figure 1. Considering the different natural conditions in Belgorod and 
Oreol the efficient isoquants are defined by the independent farms in the two regions. 
Agroholdings are located within the regional input requirement set, suggesting that on average 
they are operating less efficiently than the independent enterprises in the respective regions. 
Figure 2: Efficiency of Agricultural Production by Farm Type 
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Source: Goskomstat Rossii (2003), Bookkeeping results of holdings, Oblast Belgorod (data for 2001-
2003), Data on farms in Oblast Oreol in 2002 (Petrikov, 2005). 
However, with significant investment in labour saving technologies it could be expected 
that the labour partial productivity would be higher in agroholdings than in other farms. 
Figure 2 shows that there are three groups of farms which have almost the same labour 
productivity amounting to 100 thousand Roubles per labour unit. To them belong the 
corporate farms (agroholdings and independent farms) in Belgorod as well as the independent 
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 corporate farms in Oreol. The figure also provides that the labour productivity in the 
agroholdings’ members is not in any case larger than in other farms. This finding confirms the 
result deduced from figure 1 regarding the efficiency of the different groups of farms. Thus, 
there is an indication for that the "remuneration" argument fails to hold, i.e. that fostering the 
establishing of agroholdings is insufficient to guarantee an efficient use of the absorbed 
resources (land and labour). 
5.2 Farm individual analysis 
The results based on aggregated characteristics (Figures 1 and 2) surprisingly signal that 
despite investment in modern technologies agroholdings appear to be less efficient than other 
farms. In the following, employing the results of a survey conducted in 2004 in Oreol oblast, 
we discuss the development of agroholdings by using the individual farm level data.  
Tables 1 to 3 present individual characteristics of 11 agroholdings members in 
comparison with those of 19 independent farms in Oroel oblast averaged across years 1999-
2003, unless stated otherwise. The significance of differences between groups is evaluated by 
employing t-test of difference between group means.  
Table 1 presents some survey results regarding the physical environment. The group of 
farms that are part of an agroholding is significantly larger which is in line with observations 
in earlier studies. Agroholdings also exhibit a higher scale efficiency and a larger number of 
agroholding-members operate at efficient scale (see also Table 3). Farm location is supposed 
to determine physical environment and because mother companies of agroholdings would 
rather select farms that operate within a favorable natural environment, the agroholding 
members would have higher land quality than other farms. Farm location would also 
predetermine market infrastructure and access to input and output markets, which is expected 
to be favorable for agroholding members. Table 1 shows that the central companies select 
those farms that are endued with highly productive land. This is also an indication for that 
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 transport cost and the access to the input and factor markets influence the location decisions 
of agroholdings. However, the variables which should capture the market infrastructure are of 
minor importance. Only the access to the equipment market seems to be significantly different 
for agroholding members and independent farms. These findings are not too surprising, since 
they indicate that the regional effects appear to be more important than the firm specific 
effects. In addition, the significant difference between the groups regarding the access to 
equipment may be endogenous. Since traders know, which farms are the part of an 
agroholding, they may put more attention to these farms through better information provision 
and special marketing offers. Some additional indications for this effect are shown in Table 2. 
Table 1: Survey results regarding physical environment  
 mean: sample
standard 
deviatio: 
sample 
mean: 
agrohol-
dings 
mean: 
indepen-
dent farms 
test 
statistics 
signi-
ficance1
average soil productivity index, 
points (on the scale of 1 to 100) 47.65 15.50 57.19 40.34 3.64 + 
  output specialisation, %6) 0.64 0.18 0.74 0.61 2.88 + 
Total agricultural land, 
ha 8371 6767 14519 4894 4.45 + 
Workers in agriculture, 
man 233 137 334 177 3.17 + 
Livestock, heads 902 771 869 802 0.31 n.s. 
Fixed capital, 000Rub 
2003 40159 54760 66459 24248 1.72 + 
si
ze
 
Total revenue, 000Rub 
2003 22383 19815 23830 19742 0.63 n.s. 
qualified 
managers2)   2.07 0.58 2.09 2.00 0.44 n.s. 
la
bo
ur
: 
op
po
rtu
ni
-
tie
s t
o 
hi
re
 
skilled workers2) 2.20 0.66 2.36 2.06 1.28 n.s. 
material inputs 3) 2.07 0.52 2.00 2.11 -0.24 n.s. 
in
pu
ts
 
equipment 3) 1.87 0.94 2.18 1.61 1.85 + 
m
ar
ke
t  
in
fr
as
tru
ct
ur
e 
output market 3) 2.10 0.66 2.27 2.00 1.25 n.s. 
d in
fr
as
tr tdistance to regional 
centre, km  71.90 43.73 66.73 73.50 -0.45 n.s. 
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 average distance to grain 
market, km 62.77 55.60 41.27 66.00 -1.77 - 
 
roads and transport 
infrastructure3) 2.27 0.87 2.27 2.28 -0.02 n.s. 
crop production 
 2.40 0.77 2.64 2.17 2.06 + 
te
ch
no
lo
gy
 
le
ve
l i
n 
20
03
5)
livestock 
 2.07 1.05 2.00 1.94 0.18 n.s. 
1) plus-sign stands for significantly higher, minus-sign - significantly lower (in both cases at 5 % 
significance level); n.s.- not significant;  
2)  assessed by the farm head, score 1 - ‘no possibility’ to 3 - ‘good possibilities’;  
3)  assessed by the farm head, score 1 - ‘very bad’ to 5 - ‘very good’. 
5)  assessed by the farm head, score 1 - ‘technology is dated’ to 5 - ‘one of the most modern 
technologies’;  
6) share of the revenue of three main outputs in the total farm revenue.  
A higher level of vertical and spatial diversification in agroholdings allows to reduce 
scale of production diversification in their individual members, thus members to an 
agroholding would tend to have a higher degree of specialization, which is confirmed by the 
data. The emergence of agroholdings was fostered to overcome management problems. 
However, in order to implement new management and new technologies farm restructuring 
was necessary to make the enterprises fit for the market. This would imply that the holding 
members have higher investment than other farms and that these investments are targeted for 
the adoption of new technologies. 
The results regarding institutional restructuring, economic and social environment are 
presented in Table 2. While the re-organisation of total labour input is already evident from 
Figure 1 and 2, the data in Table 2 shows that institutional restructuring concerns not only the 
number of workers but also the management. Agroholding members have a lower manager to 
worker ratio than independent farms. In addition, agroholding farms have a new farm head. 
Additionally, we can see that managers substituted more often in agroholding than in other 
farms. Moreover, the head of the agroholding members appear to be more risk-loving than his 
counterparts in independent corporate farms. On the one hand, this may indicate that the new 
farm heads possess comparatively higher entrepreneurial skill. On the other hand, the more 
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 risk-loving behaviour of agroholdings members may be explained by a lower level of 
financial risks within an agroholding company. Besides institutional changes at the 
management level the data in Table 2 also points at the adjustments regarding production 
technologies in the agroholding members. The investment volume in the agroholding 
members was significantly higher that in the independent farms. This apparently led to a 
higher speed of fixed capital formation. In addition, investments in the agroholding members 
were introduced primarily rather to modernize the production technology than just maintain 
the existing capital stock. Consistently, the managers of the agroholdings assess their 
technology level in 2003 as relatively high. However, this regards only crop production, 
suggesting that the livestock production is of minor importance in the holding members. The 
assessment of the technology level was done for 1999 and 2003, respectively. The results 
provide that in 1999 the farms in both groups had a similar level of technology in crop and 
livestock production. The technology level decreased till 2003 in the independent farms, 
however this was observable only in livestock production for the agroholding members. The 
significant difference regarding technology level in crop production in 2003 results from the 
fact that the holding members consider their technology to be almost the same as in 1999. 
This result is inconsistent with the finding that the investment has a mainly capital improving 
character. In addition, there is evidence that adjustments have taken place regarding not only 
factor input but output as well. The holding members show a significantly higher 
specialization than the other group of farms.  
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 Table 2: Survey results regarding institutional restructuring, economic and social 
environment 
 sample mean 
standard 
deviation
mean: 
agrohol-
dings 
mean: 
indepen-
dent farms 
test 
statistics 
signi-
ficance1
)
age of the enterprise, years 14.8 10.3 6.5 19.7 -5.34 - 
new farm head since 
19932) 0.53 0.51 0.01 0.01 4.14 + 
Share of managers-co-
owners, % 0.43 0.50 0.09 0.51 -3.66 - 
share of managers worked 
in farm before re-
structuring, %  
0.48 0.26 0.29 0.56 -2.96 - 
managers/employees ratio 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.05 -3.33 - 
managers education level3) 0.72 0.28 0.74 0.70 0.50 n.s. 
in
st
itu
tio
na
l 
risk attitude (risk loving) 4) 2.3 1.0 2.8 2.0 2.27 + 
fixed capital growth rate 1.35 0.82 1.75 1.12 1.71 + 
investments in fixed 
production capital, Mio 
RUB 
4.66 6.50 7.92 2.49 1.92 + 
investments in fixed 
production capital per 
1000 ha of agricultural 
land, Mio RUB 
0.58 0.54 0.49 0.53 -0.27 n.s. 
structure of investments 
"capital improving", share 
in  total value of 
investments 
0.40 0.35 0.54 0.29 1.83 + 
bank credits2) 0.60 0.50 0.27 0.83 -3.51 - 
bank credits as well as 
regional and federal loans2) 0.73 0.45 0.55 0.83 -1.65 - 
leverage ratio 0.07 0.13 0.14 0.03 1.78 + 
long-term liabilities, Mio 
RUB 1.81 2.60 3.21 1.01 1.98 + 
average adjusted price of 
wheat5) 1.00 0.36 0.87 1.07 -3.62 - 
average adjusted price of 
milk5) 1.00 0.16 0.92 1.04 -4.40 - 
average adjusted price of 
fuel5) 1.00 0.27 0.95 1.02 -1.63 n.s. 
ec
on
om
ic
 
average adjusted price of 
fertilizer5) 1.00 0.25 1.04 0.98 1.54 n.s. 
so
c ia
l problems with the 
personnel6) 1.99 0.59 2.0 2.0 0.02 n.s. 
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 average age of workers 36.3 4.65 38.8 40.4 -0.84 n.s. 
average age of the 
manager 46.4 7.8 43.5 47.8 -1.44 n.s. 
 
annual wages, Rub 15590 5410 14950 15490 -0.28 n.s. 
1) plus-sign stands for significantly higher, minus-sign - significantly lower (in both cases at 5 % 
significance level); n.s.- not significant;  
2)  dummy variable; 
3)  share of managers with higher education;  
4)  assessed, score 1 – ‘risk averse’ to 5 - ‘risk loving’; 
5)  In this case test was conducted employing the data over the whole period.  To adjust the data for the 
impact of inflation for each farm the price was adjusted by the annual sample average.  
6)  assessed, score 1 – ‘no problems’ to 5 - ‘very many problems’. 
 
As a part of economic environment, the structure of financial obligations is reported in 
Table 2. Long-term liabilities are significantly higher in the agroholding members than in 
independent agricultural enterprises. However, the agroholding members access the 
importance of the conventional creditors lower than the independent enterprises. This 
suggests that the holding members have additional opportunities to raise fund for investment. 
This also supports the statement that the mother companies provide the corresponding 
financial means. The analysis of economic performance based on monetary indicators as 
revenue and profit only, may lead to a biased assessment, if individual stages of a vertically 
organized company regarded as independent economic units. The survey data confirm that the 
agroholding members get significantly lower output prices and higher input prces. For dairy 
farms operating in the Moscow Region, Bezlepkina et al (2007) find a clear tendency of better 
performing farms paying substantially higher wages and receiving higher output prices, 
presumably due to higher quality. The results are opposite in this study. Figure 3 presents the 
distributions of output prices for wheat and milk in both groups of farms. There could be two 
explanations for this empirical result: 1) Output prices in the agroholdings are lower, because 
they are adjusted by a risk premium, i.e. since farmers’ price risks reduced within an 
agroholding, they do pay for that; 2) Agroholding members are restricted in their choice of the 
marketing channels and thus cannot draw the best obtainable prices.  As can be also seen from 
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 Table 2, the bank loans are less important for the agroholding members than for independent 
farms. This suggests that agroholding members possess other sources of finance, as those of 
the mother company of the agroholding. One might expect that the agroholding members are 
obliged to repay a part of these credits by the delivery of their products to agroholding-owned 
marketing agencies. The prices received by the farms then have the character of transfer 
instead of market prices.  
Figure 3: Distribution of output prices  
 
holding members 
independent farms 
Wheat Milk 
 
Note: The price distributions were derived for the 1999-2003 period. In each farm prices were 
adjusted by the annual average in order to adjust the data  for the impact of inflation.  
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 Table 3: Survey results regarding performance 
 sample mean 
standard 
deviation
mean: 
agrohol-
dings 
mean: 
indepen-
dent farms
test 
statistics 
signi-
ficance1)
Profitability 0.18 0.25 0.10 0.20 -1.12 n.s. 
per worker 98.32 67.16 69.34 99.85 -2.57 - 
per ha of agricultural 
land 3.61 3.18 1.74 4.05 -4.22 - re
tu
rn
s, 
10
00
 R
U
B
 
to fixed capital 0.95 0.77 0.95 0.93 0.07 n.s. 
overall TE 0.59 0.22 0.60 0.58 0.9662) n.s. 
% of farms with 
TE=1 (within own 
group) 
8% n.a. 17% 4% n.a. n.a. 
scale free TE 0.72 0.19 0.69 0.73 0.5132) n.s. 
scale efficiency  0.81 0.18 0.86 0.78 0.0002) + 
ef
fic
ie
nc
y 
sc
or
es
 
% farms with SE=1 
(within own group) 11% n.a. 24% 5% n.a. n.a. 
winter wheat yield, 
100 kg per ha 29.7 8.5 25.2 32.1 3.56 - 
barley yield, 100 kg 
per ha 26.5 9.9 17.0 29.5 -6.61 - 
milk per cow in 
2003, kg 2786.1 1111.7 2052.5 3193.7 -46.28 - 
daily weight 
increment of cattle in 
2003, gram 
449.8 336.7 417.5 467.8 -3.67 - 
pa
rti
al
 p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
 m
ea
su
re
s 
daily weight 
increment of pigs in 
2003, gram 
191.7 166.4 200.5 181.8 1.46 n.s. 
1) plus-sign stands for significantly higher, minus-sign - significantly lower (in both cases at 5 % 
significance level); n.s.- not significant; 
2)  p-value for Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric test 
 
The statistical significance of differences in overall TE, scale free TE and scale 
efficiency is assessed using a non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test. A non-parametric test is 
required here because the technical efficiencies are effectively censored between zero and 
one. The information presented in Table 3 is also consistent with the conjectures resulting 
from Figures 1 and 2. Agroholding members neither show a higher profitability, nor do they 
allow for a higher remuneration of factors. The efficiency scores between the groups of farms 
do also not show any statistically significant differences. Scale efficiency is higher in 
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 agroholdings signalling that they are closer to optimal scale, which is also observed in the 
higher number of agroholding members operating at efficient scale (farms with scale 
efficiency equals 1).  
In conclusion, the favorable location, improved technological adjustments and new 
management introduced by agroholdings suggest that they presumably possess serious 
advantages compared to other agricultural enterprises in Russia. Surprisingly, according to 
our results, these advantages presumably have not enabled them to reach a higher economic 
performance.  
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
The lack of performance in agroholding members suggests that principal management 
problems are present in agroholdings that hamper making further step towards higher 
efficiency and productivity. These developments show that technological and managerial 
innovations introduced by agroholdings not necessarily move agricultural production on an 
efficient trajectory. This finding is consistent with statements of holding managers that can be 
found in the literature, but also with assessment of politicians. Despite a tendency towards 
integration, some recent developments support the view that agroholdings are not first best 
solutions in either case. The first attempts of disposing the agricultural enterprises by 
agroholdings (e.g. GAZPROM, TATNEFT, RAZGULIAY-UKRROS, Interfax, various 
issues) signal that gas and oil companies are not interested in agriculture as part of their 
business. According to the Governor of Belgorod oblast, only eight of the fifteen agroholdings 
operating in oblast have fulfilled the expectation regarding the adoption of technological and 
organisational innovations. The other seven companies failed either because of insufficient 
investment or because of the managerial failures. 
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 Finding no evidence for improved performance of agricultural producers that are 
agroholding members does not suggest that agroholding will fail in any case. Membership to a 
holding can take different forms from ownership to contractual arrangements and different 
types of relationships will have different performances as well. Literature suggests various 
reasons for economies of integration and provides the opposing conclusions as the result of 
different underlying assumptions. Leiblein et al (2002) conclude that decisions to integrate per 
se do not significantly influence technological performance directly, rather the performance is 
driven by factors underlying governance choice. In this sense our data set is biased, because in 
both regions the establishing of agroholdings was strongly supported by the local government. 
Further investigations on the impact of a membership to an agroholding on performance 
should control for factors leading to integration.  
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 Appendix A: Farm survey description 
The study is based on data obtained in the framework of a farm survaey of 90 agricultural 
enterprises from different regions in Russia including 30 farms from Orel. The data contains 
results of structured interviews with farm managers conducted in 2004, as well as farm 
accounting data from 1999 to 2003. In this paper, we utilise the data which is related to:  
- basic characteristics of the farm: farm age, year of restructuring, farm location; 
- enterprise organisation: farm organisational form, membership in agricultural holding 
company, etc.;  
- managerial characteristics: farm director and management age, education, on-farm 
experience and attitude toward risk; 
- production-related characteristics: size of land operated, number of livestock, number 
of workers, specialisation, other production aspects;  
- farm finance: liquidity, leverage ratio, credit access, investment activities and volume, 
as well as investment financing sources and use;  
- business environment: input and output market infrastructure, opportunity to employ 
well-educated and experienced managers and skilled workers, provision of risk 
sharing instruments and training services; 
- risk sources and management: farmers’ assessment of various sources of risk 
(production, price, financial risk, etc.) and their responses to them. 
In this study we focus on the farms from the Oroel region whose part of agroholdings is large 
enough for a comparison with other corporate farms. Of the total number of surveyed farms in 
Oroel, 11 are the members of different agroholdings.  10 of them are private companies and 
one is a production cooperative. The remaining 19 farms are represeted by 8 private 
companies, 9 cooperatives and 2 state-owned enterprises.  
The additional data on the farms - members of agroholdings contains the year of joining an 
agroholding, the managerial and production adjustments introduced at the farms since that 
time, information about the share  of the agroholding company in the farm equity and vice 
versa, as well as information about the sectors where other members of the agroholding are 
from.  
Farms were not selected randomly. In view of most farms’ unwillingness to provide their 
internal data, most of the sample farms were selected on the basis of the established contacts 
of the regional extension office. However, farm selection was done considering two main 
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 aspects: the sample comprises farms of different organisational forms and financial 
performance; farms with very strong specialisation (potato or vegetable production farms, 
poultry, as well as breeding farms) were not included in the sample.  
The investigated farms are primarily crop-producing farms with varying livestock holdings. 
On average, the share of revenue from crop production is 64 per cent.  
Appendix B: Efficiency analysis 
The Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) technique allows for both input and output 
orientation. In this study an input oriented model with the objective to produce the observed 
outputs with as little inputs as possible is used (Fare et al, 1994). Schematically, the 
production technology L transforming factors of production (inputs x1 and x2) into a single 
output (y) is presented in Figure 1.  
                                      x2    
                                              S
                                                       L(y)
                                                                                •A
                                                            •B
                                                                                         S’
                                        0                                                            x1
                                  Figure : Input orientation with inputs x1 and x2
L(y) denotes the subset of all input vectors (with a frontier of SS’) which yield at least 
y. In this case, the efficiency of production units in the interior of the frontier, can be 
measured by the distance to the frontier. For example, if a firm produces at point A, then its 
efficiency can be measured with the ratio of OB/OA.  
DEA uses a piece-wise linear convex hull approach for frontier estimation. This can 
be achieved with mathematical programming (MP). Assuming there are data on K inputs and 
M outputs for each of N farms and variable returns to scale (VRS), pure technical efficiency 
(PTE) can be computed from the following linear programming (LP) model: 
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 min λn                                                             (1) 
subject to  ∑≤ N yzy   ,  m=1…M 
= ,,
,  
where  λn stands for input-oriented technical efficiency, zn are intensity variables. The 
value of λn attained is the pure technical efficiency score for the n-th firm. It will satisfy: λn  
≤ 1, wi
For the purposes of the analysis of technical efficiency we measure the farm’s production 
output as annual farm revenues from agricultural production. The output function is a function 
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th a value of 1 indicating a point on the frontier and hence a technically efficient firm. 
The linear programming problem must be solved N times, once for each firm in the sample. 
Overall technical efficiency is decomposed into its two components: (a) scale efficiency and  
(b) pure technical efficiency (Fare et al., 1994). These calculations imply some standard 
changes in model (1), which can be found in (Fare et al, 1994; Coelli, 1998). The resulting 
decomposition of the overall technical efficiency measure is then looks as follows: 
overall TE = scale free TE x scale efficiency. 
of the area of sown land, labour defined as the annual average number of employees involved 
in production, the value of fixed production capital, materials costs and time dummies. All 
monetary data were measured in 1,000 roubles and adjusted to the year 2003 by the regional 
price indices for agricultural inputs and output as they are provided by (Goskomstat, 2004 and 
2005). 
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